

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00027 01 OF 02 031926Z

67

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01

/151 W

----- 131066

P R 031800Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0045

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0027

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR US CSCE DEL, SEE PARA 10

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AHG MEETING OF MAY 24, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN ITS MAY 24 MEETING, AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSED THE REPORT OF THE MAY 22 INFORMAL SESSION WITH EAST (VIENNA 4651 AND 4653), RECEIVED BILATERAL REPORTS FROM THE UK, GREEK AND CANADIAN DELEGATIONS AND DISCUSSED DATA RECEIVED FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP. THE US REP NOTED THAT THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES APPEARED TO BE INTERESTED IN THE WESTERN NON-INCREASE FORMULA PRESENTED IN THE INFORMAL SESSION. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) NOTED THAT THE EAST

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00027 01 OF 02 031926Z

APPEARED TO BE STONEWALLING IN TERMS OF ITS OWN MOVE-

MENT AND GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF POCKETING CONCESSIONS WITHOUT BEING READY TO RESPOND IN A LIKE MANNER. FRG REP (BEHREND) NOTED THAT THE ALLIES HAD UNAVOIDABLY ENLARGED THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMAL BY INTRODUCING THE COMMON CEILING AS A CONDITION FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT, US REP COMMENTED THAT NATURE OF THIS CONDITION SHOULD PERHAPS BE CLARIFIED TO PREVENT EAST FROM USING IT TO BLOCK DISCUSSION. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CANADA AND CANADIAN MINISTRY OFFICIALS IN WHICH SOVIET AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN THE WEST AND STATED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT PURSUE THEIR POLICY OF DETENTE AT A SLOWER PACE TO ALLOW TIME FOR THINGS TO SHAKE DOWN. CANADIAN REP OBSERVED THAT THESE CONVERSATIONS SUPPORTED OTHER INDICATIONS IN VIENNA THAT THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO "STONEWALL" DURING THE PRESENT PHASE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. GREEK REP (DOUNTAS) REPORTED ON A BILATERAL IN WHICH THE SOVIET REP REPEATED VIEWS THAT THE WESTERN DEMARCHE WAS THE FIRST SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE WESTERN SIDE. A RECENT POLISH/UK BILATERAL WAS REPORTED IN WHICH POLISH DELEGATION ASSERTED THAT THE EASTERN POSITION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A PRECONDITION TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATION. REPRESENTING THE CONSENSUS OF THE AHG, THE CHAIRMAN (GREEK REP DOUNTAS) INSTRUCTED THE MC REP (GOOSENS) TO REPORT TO THE MBFR WORKING GROUP THAT MISSING DATA PERTAINING TO HELICOPTER AND SSM FORCES IN EAST-WEST FORCE STRUCTURES WERE NEEDED BY THE AHG BY MID-JUNE, AND THAT THE AHG SUGGESTED A TRILATERAL FORUM TO DEVELOP THE DATA.

END SUMMARY

DISCUSSION OF MAY 22 INFORMAL SESSION

2. THE US REP OPENED DISCUSSION OF THE MAY 22 INFORMAL SESSION (DETAILS IN VIENNA 4651 AND VIENNA 4653) BY STATING THAT THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES APPEARED TO BE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00027 01 OF 02 031926Z

INTERESTED IN THE WEST'S NON-INCREASE FORMULA AND HAD REQUESTED ITS REPETITION AT DICTATION SPEED IN ORDER TO WRITE IT DOWN. HE ADDED THAT THE ALLIES HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN FORESTALLING QUESTIONS ON THE PROPOSAL BY NOT INSISTING ON IMMEDIATE REACTION.

3. NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT THE EASTERN SIDE APPEARED TO BE CONDUCTING "STONEWALLING" TACTICS IN THE

LAST INFORMAL AND WERE GIVING THE APPEARANCE OF POCKET-
ING CONCESSIONS WITHOUT BEING READY TO RESPOND WITH
CONCESSIONS OF THEIR OWN. HE NOTED THAT THE ALLIED
OFFER OF A NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL, PROVIDED THE EAST
AGREED TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, HAD WIDENED
UNAVOIDABLY THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMAL FROM THE AGREED
TOPIC OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE
OUTSET. THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE ALLIES HAD
NEEDED TO PRESENT THE COMMON CEILING AS A CONDITION FOR
MAKING A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT. HOWEVER, POLISH
REP STRULAK HAD COUNTERED THAT IN EFFECT THE WEST WAS
USING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF A COMMON CEILING AS A PRECON-
DITION TO SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD
BE REDUCED FIRST. IN STRULAK'S VIEW, THIS WAS ASKING
TOO MUCH. NETHERLANDS REP COMMENTED THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT HAVE TO
SETTLE ONLY FOR A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON
CEILING IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT DISCUSSION AS A
TACTICAL MATTER.

4. FRG REP STATED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE
EAST WAS SHADOW-BOXING, TRYING TO SLOW DOWN THE PACE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. REFERRING TO PREVIOUS COMMENTS,
FRG REP NOTED THAT THE ALLIES HAD THEMSELVES UNAVOID-
ABLY ENLARGED THE SCOPE OF THE INFORMAL BY REFERRING
TO THE COMMON CEILING. FRG REP STATED HE HAD THE
"UNCOMFORTABLE FEELING" THAT NON-INCREASE OFFER WAS NO
GREAT SURPRISE TO THE EAST AND THAT IT SHOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO GET A CORRESPONDING CONCESSION FROM THEM.
HE ALSO THOUGHT POLISH REP STRULAK'S REMARK REPRESENTED
AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF EASTERN THINKING WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH.

5. NETHERLANDS REP SUGGESTED THAT IN FUTURE INFORMALS,
THE WEST SHOULD TRY TO REFUTE THE EASTERN CONTENTION
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00027 01 OF 02 031926Z

THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING WAS A PRECONDI-
TION FOR AGREEMENT ON PHASING. THE WEST SHOULD STATE
CLEARLY AND REPEATEDLY THAT THE GOAL OF PHASING AND
ASYMMETRIC REDUCTION WAS TO REACH PARITY AND THUS SUP-
PORT STATED NEGOTIATION OBJECTIVES OF INCREASING
SECURITY FOR ALL. HE FELT THAT THE EASTERN PRECON-
DITION ARGUMENT COULD BE TURNED AROUND AND THE WEST
COULD ARGUE THAT THE EAST'S DESIRE FOR WESTERN ACCEPT-
ANCE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WAS ALSO A
PRECONDITION.

6. UK REP (ROSE NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY
FOR THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO WIDEN THE DISCUSSION
AT THE INFORMAL IN ORDER TO GET THEIR OWN IDEAS
ACROSS. THEREFORE, THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE

FACT THAT THE EAST COULD ALSO INTRODUCE TOPICS OTHER THAN THE ANNOUNCED ONE OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. ITALIAN DEPREP (TALIANI) POINTED OUT THE COMMON CEILING IS A LINK BETWEEN PHASES AND THAT THE WEST COULD NOT AFFORD TO ACCEPT THE EASTERN LOGIC THAT THE COMMON CEILING IS OUTSIDE THE TOPIC OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE STATED THAT THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE STRESSED IN ALL MEETINGS WITH THE EAST.

7. BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) COMMENTED THAT THE EASTERN REMARKS MADE AT THE END OF THE INFORMAL SESSION WERE MOST REVEALING, REFERRING TO EASTERN COMMENT THAT IF THE WEST WAS READY TO ENTER INTO A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT, IT SHOULD BE READY TO ACCEPT THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROGRAM. UK REP SUGGESTED THAT AT THE NEXT INFORMAL THE ALLIES TAKE INITIATIVE, POINT OUT WHY THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WAS DIFFERENT FROM SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS AND WHY SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE. FRG

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00027 02 OF 02 031941Z

67

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01

/151 W

----- 000152

P R 031800Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0046

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0027

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR US CSCE DEL, SEE PARA 10

REP DISAGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT THE REFERENCES TO SYMMETRICAL REDUCTION WERE MADE IN A JOKING MANNER AFTER THE INFORMAL SESSION WAS OVER AND IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO REFER TO IT UNLESS THE EAST RAISED THE ISSUE. SUBJECT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

8. CANADIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT THE STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 14 (VIENNA 4653) , WHICH INDICATED THAT THE ALLIED TOTAL FOR NATO GROUND FORCES INCLUDED ALL FORCES THAT WEAR THE GROUND FORCE UNIFORM, COULD CAUSE A PROBLEM WHEN APPLIED TO CANADA, INASMUCH AS ALL CANADIAN FORCES WEAR THE SAME NATIONAL DEFENSE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00027 02 OF 02 031941Z

UNIFORM. GRANDE ALSO NOTES THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD BE OPPOSED TO EXTENDING THE SUMMER RECESS THROUGH THE ENTIRE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER AS MENTIONED BY USSR REP AT THE END OF THE INFORMAL AND AGAIN BILATERALLY TO BELGIAN REP.

BILATERALS

9. CANADIAN REP GAVE SUMMARY OF MAY 16 CONVERSATION IN OTTAWA BETWEEN SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CANADA AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CANADIAN MINISTRY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. ACCORDING TO THE CANADIAN REP'S ACCOUNT, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, IN AN EXPANSIVE MOOD, REFERRED TO A LARGE NUMBER OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN THE WEST AND STATED THAT THESE CHANGES HAVE CAUSED THE SOVIETS TO REASSESS THEIR POLICY. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD NOT CAUSE A SHIFT IN POLICY ORIENTATION. IN PARTICULAR, NO CHANGE TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE WAS FORESEEN AS THERE WAS NO "VIALE ALTERNATIVE". HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WISH TO PURSUE THEIR POLICY AT A SLOWER PACE. THE CANADIAN REP OBSERVED THAT THESE REMARKS BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STRONGLY SUPPORTED INDICATIONS IN VIENNA THAT THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO "STONEWALL" IN THE PRESENT PHASE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

10. THE CANADIAN REP WENT ON TO GIVE HIS GOVERNMENT'S

VIEWS ON SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL. THE OFFICIAL VIEW IN OTTAWA IS THAT THERE WILL BE NO NEW INITIATIVES FROM MOSCOW IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZE PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND WILL WANT TO TAKE STOCK OF NEW WESTERN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN FRANCE. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT MAJOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS ARE LIKELY IN THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR TERM. THEY THEREFORE EXPECT A PAUSE IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE THAT WOULD LEAD TO A DELAY OF CSCE PHASE III UNTIL AUTUMN.

11. BELGIAN REP STATED THAT REMARKS MADE TO HIM BY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00027 02 OF 02 031941Z

USSR REP KHLESTOV AT RECENT SOCIAL ENCOUNTER WERE IN LINE WITH THOSE OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CANADA. KHLESTOV HAD STATED THAT WESTERN DEMARCHE AT MAY 22 INFORMAL INDICATED SOME WILLINGNESS ON PART OF ALLIES TO ACHIEVE MOMENTUM, BUT IMPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE LITTLE PROGRESS COULD BE EXPECTED IN THIS SESSION.

12. GREEK REP INTRODUCED A MENCON OF A MEETING ON MAY 24 BETWEEN THE SOVIET REP AND GREEK REP (SEPTTEL). HE UNDERScoreD THE REMARKS OF THE SOVIET REP THAT THE WESTERN DEMARCHE, WITH REGARD TO NO FORCE INCREASE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF THE AGREEMENT, WAS THE FIRST TIME THE WESTERN SIDE SHOWED ANY SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY. GREEK REP DREW ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION FROM THE SOVIET REP AS TO WHETHER THE PROPOSAL FOR ONLY ONE PLENARY AND ONE INFORMAL PER WEEK INDICATED AN ATTEMPT BY THE WEST TO SLOW DOWN THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. GREEK REP NOTED HE HAD RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS SIMPLY AN INDICATION OF WESTERN CONCERN TO PREVENT A REDUNDANCY IN PLENARY STATEMENTS AND MIGHT SUGGEST A DEADLOCK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. UK DEPREP (GOODALL) INTRODUCED AN ACCOUNT OF A LUNCHEON BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UK AND POLISH DELEGATIONS (SEPTTEL). UK DEPREP UNDERLINED THE POLISH ASSERTION THAT THE EASTERN POSITION, THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A PRECONDITION FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

AHG CONSIDERATION OF DATA RECEIVED FROM MBFR WORKING GROUP

14. MC REP COMMENTED ON MAY 15 MESSAGE FROM MBFR

WORKING GROUP TO AHG REGARDING DATA PACKAGE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO AHG REQUEST OF APRIL. DATA PACKAGE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO DELEGATION IN VIENNA ON MAY 21 AND 22 AND FORWARDED TO NATIONAL CAPITALS AND SPC FOR CONSIDERATION. MC REP CORRECTED ERROR IN ANNEX A LISTING THE STRENGTH OF GSFG AT 395,000. THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00027 02 OF 02 031941Z

CORRECT STRENGTH IS 359,000. MC REP WENT ON TO UNDERScore THAT DATA RECEIVED FROM MBFR WORKING GROUP WERE STRICTLY UNOFFICIAL AND HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED BY SPC. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT CERTAIN DATA REQUESTED BY THE AHG, PARTICULARLY THOSE PERTAINING TO ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE EAST/WEST GROUND FORCES, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS HELICOPTER AND SSM MANPOWER, WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN NATO. HE NOTED THE QUESTION POSED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP AS TO WHETHER THESE GAPS IN INFORMATION WERE REGARDED AS INHIBITING THE AHG AT THIS STAGE.

15. UK REP STATED THAT MISSING DATA WERE DEFINITELY NEEDED BY AHG TO DEFINE AND UNDERSTAND DEFINITIONAL ANOMALIES. US REP, AGREEING WITH UK REP, STATED HE FORESAW A NEED FOR SUCH FIGURES, THAT USSR REP HAD ALREADY CHALLENGED WESTERN DATA AND DEFINITIONS. US REP RECOMMENDED THAT THE NEEDED DATA BE DEVELOPED BY A TRILATERAL (US/UK/FRG) GROUP, SINCE A SPECIAL OPEN-ENDED NATO INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AS MENTIONED IN THE MBFR WORKING GROUP COMMUNIQUE WOULD TAKE TOO LONG. US REP ESTIMATED THAT DATA WOULD BE NEEDED BY MID-JUNE. CANADIAN AND GREEK REPS AGREED. UK REP ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM WAS TO CLARIFY DEFINITIONAL DIFFERENCES BUT THAT THE DATA WOULD HELP TO UNDERSTAND THEM.

16. FRG REP, WHILE AGREEING THAT THE AHG NEEDED THE DATA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, STATED THAT ANY DECISION INVOLVING THEIR USE WITH THE EAST WOULD REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT POLICY JUDGEMENTS AND WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE SPC. HE ELABORATED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, LARGER ESTIMATES FOR PACT OR NATO STRENGTH WOULD INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF THEIR REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING, AND THAT CHANGES IN THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES COULD INCLUDE ABOUT 20,000 MORE PERSONNEL IN THE FRG GROUND FORCE TOTAL.

17. UK REP STATED THAT A DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN POLICY JUDGMENTS AND TACTICS. HE OBSERVED THAT NEGOTIATION TACTICS SHOULD NOT BE THE PURVIEW OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 MBFR V 00027 02 OF 02 031941Z

THE SPC AND THAT THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD RETAIN CONTROL OVER THE TACTICS OF DATA USE. CHAIRMAN STATED THAT RECOMMENDATION FOR SPC DISCUSSIONS ON DATA MATTERS INVOLVING POLICY WOULD BEST COME FROM NATIONAL CAPITALS RATHER THAN FROM THE AHG. ITALIAN DEPREP EXPRESSED HIS AGREEMENT THAT THE MISSING DATA WAS NEEDED BY THE AHG BUT ADDED THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO INTRODUCING NEW DATA IN EAST/WEST DISCUSSIONS AT THIS STAGE.

18. CHAIRMAN REQUESTED MC REP TO COMMUNICATE TO MBFR WORKING GROUP THE AD HOC GROUP'S VIEW THAT MISSING DATA WERE NEEDED BY MID-JUNE AND THAT SUCH DATA MIGHT BEST BE DEVELOPED IN A TRILATERAL FORUM.

19. NEXT AHG MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 27, 1974.RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00027
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740140-0616
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740680/aaaacrkk.tel
Line Count: 406
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AHG MEETING OF MAY 24, 1974
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005